Defining propensity to self-protect as the maximum amount an individual is willing to pay for a one-unit reduction in the probability of loss, this article studies its basic behavior and its relationship to the individual's degree of risk aversion and the initial loss probability. It is shown that if the initial loss probability is below a threshold, a more risk-averse individual has a higher propensity to self-protect, and the threshold is controlled by individuals' aversion to general downside risk increases and aversion to overall riskiness measured in variance.
INTRODUCTION
Self-protection is defined as the expenditure on reducing the probability of suffering a loss. Despite its relevance to a wide range of economic issues, 1 self-protectionespecially its relationship with an individual's attitude towards risk-has not been adequately understood. In their pioneering work, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) noted that self-protection may be attractive to both risk-averse people and risk lovers and that unlike self-insurance (the expenditure on reducing the severity of loss), self-protection and market insurance can be complements. More recently, Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) showed that a more risk-averse individual does not always pur-chase more self-protection. And Briys and Schlesinger (1990) explained this phenomenon by showing that self-protection in general does not reduce the riskiness of individuals' final wealth. Sweeney and Beard (1992a) went one step further in showing that for a general loss probability function of self-protection spending, it is impossible to characterize the preferences of an individual who always chooses a higher level of self-protection. In their attempt to verify an interesting intuition that insurance is reducing small chances of bad outcomes and gambling is increasing small chances of good outcomes, McGuire, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1991) came closest to identifying a relationship between an individual's degree of risk aversion and his or her choice of self-protection. They show that if a less risk-averse individual's optimal choice of self-protection is such that the resulting loss probability is less than a critical "switching" level, then a more risk-averse individual's optimal choice will be higher than the less risk-averse. 2 From these previous contributions, it is clear that the relationship of an individual's attitude towards risk with his or her propensity to purchase self-protection is not as straightforward as that with market insurance or self-insurance. What they do not imply, however, is that a more primitive and more precise characterization of the relationship between risk aversion and individuals' propensity to purchase self-protection is impossible insofar as one accepts the Expected Utility paradigm.
Staying within the Expected Utility framework, one can look at the problem from a slightly different angle. Specifically, instead of investigating the optimal choice of self-protection given an assumed relationship between self-protection spending and the loss probability, one can explicitly consider an individual's willingness (or propensity) to purchase self-protection-the maximum an individual is willing to pay for a given reduction in the probability of loss.
3 So far only scant effort has been made in understanding the problem from this perspective. Under various restrictions, Eeckhoudt, Godfroid, and Gollier (1997) compared the effects of risk-aversion on the risk premium [defined in Pratt (1964) ] and on the willingness to pay and conclude that some properties of the risk premium are not shared by the willingness to pay. Eeckhoudt and Godfroid (1998) showed in a quite different context with exponential utility functions that the lower the initial probability of accident, the greater the market value of a reduction in the probability.
The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive study of individuals' propensities to purchase self-protection. The author finds that the behavior of both the average propensity to self-protect (the average amount one is willing to spend for a one-unit reduction in the loss probability) and the marginal propensity to self-protect (the incremental spending one is willing to incur for an incremental reduction) is governed jointly by the initial probability of loss, risk aversion (or the concavity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function), and downside risk aversion (a concept introduced by Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler (1980) and characterized by the third derivative of the utility function). In particular, the author shows that if the initial loss probability is below a certain threshold, a more risk-averse individual does have higher propensities to self-protect and the threshold is determined by a measure of the strength of downside risk aversion relative to risk aversion. This approach thus enables one to better understand individuals' propensities for self-protection without making technical assumptions regarding the relationship between self-protection expenditure and the corresponding reduction in loss probability and also without the complications of possible multiple optima. 4 The organization of the article is as follows. The next section introduces the basic model and terminologies. The section that follows presents a detailed analysis of the propensities to self-protect. The fourth section examines the concept of "compensated increase in downside risk," which is particularly useful in the analysis of selfprotection. The last section concludes with some remarks on further research.
THE BASIC MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider individuals with initial wealth w who are at risk of losing l with probability p where l < w. Individuals' preferences are represented by the thrice-differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
In an earlier version of this paper, again available upon request from the author, it is also shown that if the usual regularity conditions are assumed, the same insights carry over to the canonical setting: if the initial probability of loss is small enough that a more risk-averse individual exhibits higher propensities to self-protect, then his optimal choice of selfprotection will be higher. Intuitive explanation for the exact relation between these two approaches is also provided there. 5 We suppress the argument p or the superscript U when there is no loss of clarity to do so. 6 Average and marginal propensities to self-protect are perhaps more descriptive than, say, average and marginal willingness to pay.
In addition, use the usual notations for higher derivatives:
MARGINAL AND AVERAGE PROPENSITIES TO SELF-PROTECT
In this section, the author studies the behavior of average and marginal propensities to self-protect. To begin, from Equation (1), it is clear that É 0 0
Q . In addition, by totally differentiating Equation (1), we have
that is, the marginal propensity is always positive. 7 In addition, also by differentiating, we have
if u is concave. In other words, Proposition 1: If u is concave, given the same reduction in the loss probability, the average propensity to self-protect is higher if the initial probability is lower.
The author next shows that the marginal propensity is increasing in F but decreasing in the initial probability if the absolute risk aversion is decreasing but not too fast.
Proposition 2: Suppose u is concave and exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Then if
where É T g is a concave transformation such that 
is a measure of T's concavity. One can therefore interpret the restriction on T as the degree of risk aversion not decreasing too fast. 9 Proofs of this and all other formal results that follow are given in the Appendix.
Q
Propositions 1 and 2 (ii) show that, in a typical case, both the average and marginal propensities to self-protect decrease with the initial probability. The intuition for this should become clear following the discussion at the end of this section.
Before characterizing the effect of risk aversion on the propensities to self-protect in the more typical cases, we first consider a couple of important benchmark cases. First, when the reduction in the loss probability is complete, p F , Equation (1) becomes:
In this case, (w -p) is equal to the certainty equivalent in its usual definition. Given the standard result of Pratt (1964) , the following is quite apparent.
Proposition 3: 
Using the result obtained so far, the behavior of U Q and V Q (V being more risk averse) when p = 1 can be depicted graphically as follows.
FIGURE 1
Propensities To Self-Protect When p=1 Q
For the general results regarding the effect of risk aversion on the propensities to selfprotect, suppose individual V is more risk-averse than individual U. Therefore we know a concave transformation É ( g exists such that ( ) and it will be strictly between 0 and 1. 10 The following proposition shows that if the initial probability p is below * ,
UV
p then the more risk-averse individual will exhibit both higher marginal and average propensities to self-protect.
Proposition 5: Suppose individual V is more risk averse than individual U and
Using this proposition, one can also obtain an indication of the magnitudes of an individual's propensities to self-protect. If individual Û is risk-neutral, his or her preferences can be represented by ˆ( ) u w w
If U is risk averse and hence more risk averse than ˆ, U one can writê The author has thus shown the following.
Corollary 1 to Proposition 5: Suppose individual U is risk averse. Then
These results show that if the initial probability is below a critical level, then riskaverse individuals do exhibit the normally expected "risk-averse" tendencies: their willingness to pay is greater than the expected benefit from the reduction in loss probability, and a more risk-averse individual has greater propensities to self-protect.
11 Figure 2 illustrates a typical case where p is small.
FIGURE 2 Propensities To Self-Protect When p Is Small
However, with a high initial probability, we know from Proposition 5 (i) that for F close or equal to 0,
from Proposition 3 (i), we also know that
and will end at a higher point at p F . In other words, risk-averse individuals will still exhibit risk-averse tendencies if the reduction in loss probability is sufficiently large. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 3 as follows:
11 These appear to be what most people [including authors such as Dionne et al. (1985) ] intuitively expect of a risk-averse individual, even though it can be easily shown that selfprotection does not reduce the riskiness of an individual's wealth distribution in the sense of mean-preserving contraction (or second-order stochastic dominance). A detailed discussion on the intuitions of these results are given following Proposition 6.
FIGURE 3 Propensities To Self-Protect When p Is Large
It is perhaps also worth noting that propositions 4 and 5 together show an interesting contrast between marginal and average propensities when 1 p (the case of pure gambling): the more risk-averse individual's average propensity is lower for all values of F , but his or her marginal propensity will overtake that of the less risk averse when F is sufficiently large.
In Proposition 6 below, the author shows that the critical level for the initial probability is determined by individuals' aversion to downside risk increases as well as aversion to overall riskiness in their wealth distributions. However, the author first proves an intermediate result, which may be of independent interest. Proposition 6: ( ( bbb bbb is larger, then the threshold p for V to exhibit higher propensities becomes lower.
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This result clearly implies that, if
An intuitive explanation of the results can be given based on the exposition provided by Briys and Schlesinger (1990) on the decomposition of the effects of self-protection into a "mean-preserving spread" and a "mean-preserving contraction."
Consider the following case of self-protection where
and hence the mean of the distribution is unchanged by the purchase of self-protection. 12 The expected benefit is l F and the marginal expected benefit is l.
.
(ii)
THE JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE
13 Briys and Schlesinger (1990) seem to have overlooked this point. 14 This can be made precise by calculating the change in variance caused by the self-protection: 
Changes in Probabilities Caused by Self-Protection (The solid lines represent the probabilities before the purchase of self-protection and the dashed lines, those after.) As is argued in Briys and Schlesinger (1990) , the total effect of self-protection can be decomposed into an upside mean-preserving contraction (a shift of all the mass at w to w Q and enough mass from w l to w Q to preserve the mean), and a downside mean-preserving spread (a shift of all remaining mass at to and so as to preserve the mean). It is clear that the relative magnitude of the upside contraction to the downside spread depends crucially on the magnitude of p: For a smaller p and hence a bigger 1 -p, the upside contraction involves a shift of more mass from both w and w -l, which necessarily entails a smaller remaining mass at w -l to shift to w l Q and w Q .
13 It follows that if p is small enough, the selfprotection will effect a reduction in overall riskiness (measured in variance) and the reduction is bigger p if is smaller.
14 Furthermore, Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler (1980) define that a distribution has more downside risk than another if the former can be obtained from the latter by a sequence of "mean-variance-preserving transformations," which is in turn defined to be a combination of a (upside) mean-preserving contraction and a (downside) mean-preserving spread that keeps the overall variance constant. They also show that individual U is averse to an increase in downside risk if and only if 0 u bbb . Clearly if 1 2 p c , the self-protection will never effect a pure increase in downside risk as the variance will be reduced. 15 Following the reasoning used in Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler (1980) , however, one can perhaps relax the requirement of a constant variance and think of any combination of an upside mean-preserving contraction and a downside mean-preserving spread as causing some increase in downside risk because risk is transferred from the upside to the downside. The author henceforth refers to any combination of an upside mean-preserving contraction and a downside mean-preserving spread as a "general downside risk increase." If so, a smaller p means self-protection effecting not only a larger reduction in overall riskiness but also a smaller general downside risk increase. In the next section, the author defines the concept of "compensated increases in downside risk" (i.e., general downside risk increases with reduced variances that an individual is indifferent to) and show that if U is both risk averse É 0 u bb and downside risk averse É 0 u bbb , then u u bbb bb can be interpreted as measuring the strength of U's aversion to general downside risk increases relative to his own aversion to overall riskiness (i.e., variance).
16 Therefore given v v u u bbb bb bbb bb , the p just small enough for individual V to be willing to pay the fair premium (i.e., l Q F ) for the reduction in loss probability 17 must be smaller than that for individual U because the p for V has to be smaller to increase the reduction in overall riskiness (effected by self-protection) and decrease the (effected) general downside risk increase.
In light of these discussions, the case of comparative risk aversion can be thought of as the case of (the more risk averse) V's risk attitudes with respect not to the distribution of his or her wealth É 
COMPENSATED INCREASE IN DOWNSIDE RISK
The problem discussed in the previous section illustrates the limitations of the concept of increasing downside risk defined and characterized in Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler (1980) . Specifically, their characterizations are useful only in handling changes in distribution that leave the overall variance constant. As we have seen, however, This, coupled with the arguments that follow in the paragraph, explains why the threshold for p is exactly 1/2 in the case where 0 u bbb . 15 See the previous footnote for details. 16 Specifically, it is shown that where / / , v v u u bbb bb bbb bb individuals will reject a combination of a general downside risk increase and a reduction in overall riskiness that U is indifferent to. Some readers may recognize / u u bbb bb as the degree of "absolute prudence" defined in Kimball (1990) to measure the strength of the precautionary saving motive. But as one can see from the discussion in the next section, no obvious interpretation exists for this coincidence. The precise connection between prudence and downside risk aversion is a topic for further research.
17 That is, the p just small enough to make V better off with self-protection where
the purchase of self-protection typically causes a combination of an upside contraction and a downside spread and hence it can be said to cause some increase in downside risk as risk is shifted from the upside to the downside, but the variance is typically not kept constant. In this section, the author considers a limited extension that is useful particularly in understanding self-protection problems.
In what follows, F and G denote distribution functions over an interval [ , ] L H .
Definition 1:
We say the change from distribution F to G is a compensated increase in downside risk for U with 0 ubb and 0 u bbb s if
(iii) There exists ˆ( , ]
, where the inequality is strict for some interval(s).
, of course means G and F have the same mean. It can be easily verified that
is equivalent to G having a smaller variance than F [for a proof, see, for example, Menezes, Greiss, and Tressler (1980, p. 924) ]. Following Menezes, Greiss, and Tressler (1980) , (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as there being some increase in downside risk: Since
c , the change from F to G increases the dispersion below x. Simi- for all x). In other words, even though the effect of the upside contraction outweighs that of the downside spread, a shift of dispersion occurs from the upside to the downside, and hence it can be said that there is some increase in downside risk (or a "general downside risk increase"). The results therefore say that a compensated increase in downside risk is a change in the probability distribution that combines a general downside risk increase and a reduction in overall riskiness in terms of the variance in such a way that U's expected utility is kept the same [(ii) of the Definition].
For the convenience of the ensuing discussion, the following are defined.
Definition 2:
We say [ ( ) 
and the inequality is strict for some interval(s).
The author next shows that the strength of individual U 's aversion to general downside risk increases relative to his or her aversion to overall riskiness is characterized by u u bbb bb
. In doing so, he follows Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) by comparing distributions É , F r g (indexed by r) which are "close" to each other. Then by Proposition 7, we can say an increase in r (the "shift parameter") represents a compensated increase in downside risk if and only if Now referring back to Definition 1, note that given (i), integration by parts gives
Therefore, in the special case where 0
i.e., the variance must be unchanged. This of course accords with the result in Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler (1980) , which says an individual with 0 u bbb is indifferent to a combination of an upside mean-preserving contraction and a downside mean-preserving spread with the overall variance kept constant. Furthermore, the proof of
. In other words, for an individual who is both risk averse and downside risk averse to be indifferent to a shift of risk from the upside to the downside, he or she needs to be compensated by a smaller overall variance.
Given these results, therefore, u u bbb bb in the case studied here can be interpreted as measuring the strength of an individual's aversion to general downside risk increases relative to his or her own aversion to overall riskiness (since v v u u bbb bb bbb bb means V will reject a combination of a general downside risk increase and a reduction in overall riskiness that U is indifferent to). Finally, consider the basic self-protection problem of the previous sections and denote the distribution of wealth before and after self-protection by ( ) F x and ( ) G x , respectively. Then 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, the author studies individuals' propensities to self-protect (the maxi-, mum amounts an individual is willing to pay for a one-unit reduction in the probability of suffering a loss) in relation to the magnitude of the initial loss probability as well as the degree of risk aversion. The author finds the average propensity to selfprotect is decreasing with the initial loss probability and the same is true of the marginal propensity under a mild restriction. Furthermore if the initial probability is below a threshold, a more risk-averse individual exhibits higher propensities to selfprotect and the threshold is controlled by downside risk aversion as well as risk aversion. In short, the author shows that when the initial probability is small, the predictions of the Expected Utility theory conform to what appears to be commonly expected of more risk-averse individuals. In a way, therefore, his results explain why such intuitions are so widely held: most self-protection situations, such as the purchase of burglar alarms, involve small initial probabilities.
The work here implies an agenda for future research. First, the analysis highlights the crucial role played by the initial loss probability in predicting individuals' behavior regarding self-protection in the Expected Utility paradigm. These regularities obtained suggest potentially fruitful empirical/experimental investigation. Among other things, they offer testable hypotheses on the validity of using the Expected Utility paradigm for the modeling of self-protection. 19 Second, because the basic problem of self-protection is embedded in the usual model of moral hazard and other economic problems, the implications of the results in these more complex contexts merit detailed examination.
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Differentiating F Q with respect to w and simplifying gives
and hence we can write ( ) ( ( )) u w T u w b for some concave É To g , we rewrite
Based on their results, Sweeney and Beard (1992) suggest that the Expected Utility theory is not an ideal choice, while McGuire, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1991) come to an opposite conclusion.
This clearly includes the case of constant risk aversion where É T g is linear.
(ii) Differentiating F Q with respect to p and simplifying gives
implies .
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) follows directly from the standard result.
(ii) We know if u is concave, (
If V is more risk averse than U, we can write ( ) ( ( )) w T u w V for some concave transformation T.
since by the concavity of T,
Proof of Proposition 4:
By Jensen's inequality, we know,
(ii) Since for p = 1
, the proof is completely analogous to that of (ii) in the previous proposition. , . . We can then obtain the result for the case where ( )0 u bbb by applying (i).
Proof of Proposition 5:
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Proof of Proposition 6:
(i) For a fixed w R ,define ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) u w u w u w l u w w T u w T u w l u w u w l u w u w l u w N © b b b b b b b b ª ¹ b b b b « º ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (b b b b b b b [since ( ( )) ( ) ( ) T u w l w l u w l N b b b and ( ( )) ( ) ( ) T u w w u w N b b b ]. Clearly ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) w
Proof of Proposition 7:
In proving this proposition, we let ˆ( , ) y 
